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I. INTRODUCTION

For over one hundred years, legal scholars, jurists, lawyers, and
many others have debated whether and to what extent the actual
intent of the legislature should play a role in statutory interpretation.
These scholars have pondered whether individuals and collectivities
can have intentions; they have asked whether it is possible for judges
to discover the legislature's actual intent; and they have questioned
whether legislative intent should play a role in judges' interpretations
of statutes. In addressing these questions, scholars have amassed a
voluminous literature devoted to defining, discovering, and implementing legislative intent; but, as we argue in this paper, such
asking a more important question:
debates have sidetracked us from
2
namely, what do statutes mean?
In this paper, we explain that judges need not search for the
legislature's actual intent when interpreting statutes. Rather, they
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1. With apologies to Daniel C. Dennett whose title we borrow. DANIEL C.
DENNETr, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1987).
2. The literature focusing on the subsequent question has asked how we
figure out statutory meaning. There are several branches of this debate:
intentionalists, non-intentionalists, textualists, currentists, and legislative
historians. See e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 216 (2000); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS (1997); MATHEW D. McCuBBiNS & DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ, WHAT
STATUTES MEAN: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE POSITIVE POLITICAL
THEORY OF LAW (2005) (manuscript on file with authors); WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2001).
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must figure out what the legislature's statutes mean. This distinction
is a subtle but important one, for while actual legislative intent may
or may not ever exist, the discovery of statutory meaning is almost
always possible. Further, the discovery of statutory meaning merely
requires judges to use the approach that they and other humans use
on a constant basis to figure out what the actions of others mean.
Indeed, whether we are discerning the meaning of statutes,
determining what our colleagues' statements mean, or discovering
what our pets' actions mean, all humans use what scholar Daniel
Dennett dubs the intentionalstance.3 That is, we treat the individual,
collectivity, animal, or object whose meaning we seek to understand
as a rational agent with beliefs, desires, and intentions.4 Of course,
such intentions need not be actual intentions written into neurons and
synapses; rather, they are metaphorical intentions that we impute to
others in order to figure out what their actions, statements, or
writings mean. 5
This paper proceeds as follows: We first provide a brief
overview of the debates about actual legislative intent and statutory
interpretation. After reviewing such debates, we emphasize that
scholars' avowal or disavowal of actual legislative intent has
prevented us from asking the more important and more fundamental
question of what statutes mean. 6 In an effort to shift the terms of the
3. DENNEr,supra note 1, at 15-21.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Costello provides a good discussion of this topic:
[A] court wishing to attribute any purpose or intent to Congress must
necessarily indulge assumptions, conventions, or benign fictions.
..The appropriate focus is on what the statutory words mean and not

on what a particular committee meant, what a group of voting
Members meant, or what a hypothetical 'average' Member meant.
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":

The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources ofLegislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 64; see also Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(claiming the presumption that Congress always has the surrounding body of
law in mind when it writes a statute is nothing more than a "benign fiction");
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (arguing that "original
meaning" better summarizes "the interpretive task" than does original
"intent"); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations
ofLaw, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517. Scalia argues:
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debate back to its original formulation (indeed, Oliver Wendell
Holmes 7 and William Blackstone 8 seem to have had the question of
statutory meaning precisely in mind), we discuss the modem
cognitive science and philosophy literatures-both of which
emphasize that humans regularly impute intentions to everything in
their environment in order to figure out what the actions that they
observe mean. After providing several simple examples of how
imputing intentions helps us to find meaning, we then extend our
discussion of intentionality to the legislative context. We conclude
with a discussion of how the intentional stance and metaphorical
intent enable judges to determine what statutes mean. While a fullfledged theory of statutory interpretation is beyond the scope of this
paper, the focused discussion of legislative intent undergirds a
general, more theoretically complex approach to discerning the
meaning of statutes.
II.

THE SEARCH FOR ACTUAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT

"[I]ntentionalism's professed goal .. , is to implement the
actual intent of the enacting Congress."
9
-Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett
For more than two hundred years, legal scholars and jurists have
[T]he quest for the "genuine" legislative intent is probably a wildgoose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect that
Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer
discretion upon [an administrative] agency, but rather (3) didn't think
about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in
this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates
principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate. Id.
7. As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "[w]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 417
(1899).
8. Indeed, William Blackstone emphasizes that "[t]he fairest and most
rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his
intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and
probable."

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND

59 (1765).
9.

ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,

supra note 2.
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debated what role the legislature's actual intent should play in
statutory interpretation.' 0 According to some, the search for actual
legislative intent when interpreting statutes is a fool's errand, for it is
impossible for collectivities, such as legislatures, to have
intentions. I1 Kenneth Shepsle, for example, drawing lessons from
the theory of social choice, concludes that "[1]egislative intent is an
internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression."'12 Not surprisingly, this claim has sparked the attention of several scholars,
who argue that the theory of social choice is not so conclusive and
that Shepsle's conclusions may not be warranted.13 For example,
Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins demonstrate that Shepsle's
conclusions rest on wildly unrealistic assumptions about the nature
of human decision making.14 William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett go one step further, arguing that "[a]ny 'legislative
intent' is not only a collective intent, but under Article I, Section 7 of
the Constitution must be a coincidence of at least two different
collective intents, that of the Senate and the House."'' .
Moving beyond debates about whether legislatures can have
10. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 8. at 58-62; Holmes, supra note 7,
at 419; Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation,7 COLuM. L. REv. 379, 381
(1907); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM.
L. REv. 381, 399-400 (1941); William D. Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of
Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 543, 595 (1988); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007 (1989); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992);
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, at 216; MCCUBBINS & RODRIGUEZ, supra
note 2; Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social
Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005).

11. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 119-46
(1999); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 437 (1988) (positing finding the "legislative
center of gravity" as one way to solve the problem of finding the intent of the
collectivity); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 223, 251-52 (1986); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L.
REv. 863, 870 (1929-1930); Shepsle, supra note 10, at 254.
12. Shepsle, supranote 10, at 239.

13. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 2; Lupia & McCubbins,
supra note 10.
14. Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 10.

15. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 2.
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intentions, other scholars question whether judges will be able to
discover the legislature's intent when one exists. According to Max
Radin, it is impossible for judges to accomplish such a task, for "[a]
legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were
discovered.., is a queerly amorphous piece of slag."' 6 Many
scholars have made similar arguments, 17 while others suggest that it
is possible for judges to discover legislative intent, so long as they do
not face 8new problems' that were unanticipated by the drafters of the
statute.'

Still other scholars ask whether judges interpreting statutes
should even care about legislative intent (assuming, of course, that
actual legislative intent exists and that judges can discover it). 19 For
those who believe in legislative supremacy, the search for legislative
intent is of paramount importance. These scholars emphasize that
Article I of the United States Constitution grants sole lawmaking
authority to the legislature and that judges must, therefore, base their
interpretations of statutes on the intent of the enacting legislature.2 °
As Roscoe Pound emphasizes: "The object of genuine interpretation
is to discover the rule which the law-maker intended to establish; to
discover the intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or
the sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule is

16. Radin, supra note 11, at 872.

17. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 11, at 425 (asserting intent is not
wholly irrelevant but rather part of the judicial inquiry, which in the end "is an
exercise in practical reason rather than foundationalist formalism"); Sanford
Levinson, Law as Literature,60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 379 (1982) (questioning

"why intentions of long-dead people from a different social world should

influence us....").
18. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, at 214.
19. See Macey, supra note 11, at 227 (favoring the "traditional approach"
to statutory interpretation, under which judges interpret statutes based on "what
the statute actually say[s] rather than on what the.., bargain was between the
interest group and the legislature").
20. See MCCUBBINS & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2; McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargainsin Statutory Interpretation,80 GEO.
L.J. 705, 737 (1991) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]; see also

McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation,57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (1993) [hereinafter

McNollgast, Legislative Intent] (stating that "judges and citizens who are
directly affected by a statute need to have a reasonably accurate method of
ascertaining the policy intent of a statute").
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expressed.",
Other scholars take issue with Pound's claim and argue that
judges should look not to legislative intent, but rather to other factors
(such as society's current norms and values) when interpreting
statutes.22 Taking the middle ground between these two extremes,
still others suggest that judges should interpret statutes on the basis
of legislative intent only when they know what members of the
legislature had in mind when they wrote the statute. For example,
Zechariah Chafee notes that "we should firmly resolve never to
speak of the intention of a testator or other writer on a given point
except after we have carefully convinced ourselves that that point
23
was actually in his mind when he wrote the words in question."
Similarly, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks state:
In interpreting a statute a court should: 1. Decide what
purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question
so as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure,
however, that it does not give the words either--(a) a
would
meaning they will not bear, or (b) a meaning which
24
violate any established policy of clear statement.
Although these scholars ask slightly different questions and
provide dramatically different arguments about the role of legislative
21. Pound, supra note 10, at 381.
22. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION (1994) (exploring the thesis that as the distance between
statutory enactment and interpretation grows, an originalist inquiry becomes
impossible or irrelevant); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean:
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 21-22 (1988)
(defending a "nautical" model of interpretation, which understands a statute as
an "ongoing process"); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 527, 528 (1982) (arguing that propositions of law are neither descriptions
of legal history nor expressions of the speaker's preference but rather are
"interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both"); Eskridge,
Jr., supra note 10 (exploring the role public values play in statutory

interpretation); Peter C. Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S.CAL. L. REv. 2505 (1992)
(critiquing Stanley Fish's post-modem approach to the interpretive process).
23. Chafee, Jr., supra note 10, at 398.
24. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1200 (William
N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1999).
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intent, they all share one feature: all are concerned with discovering
actual legislative intent. Indeed, much of the early scholarship, and
nearly all of the contemporary scholarship on statutory interpretation,
seeks to discover and implement what legislators actually had in
mind when they passed a statute.
We seek to move beyond this focus on the actual intent of the
legislature. Specifically, we seek to shift the terms of the statutory
interpretation debate away from the search for actual legislative
intent and toward a search for what statutes mean. We thus echo
26
Holmes25 and other early writers (for example, Blackstone ) who
recognized the importance of statutory meaning. Indeed, in keeping
what the legislature meant; we ask
with Holmes, we "do not inquire
27
means."
statute
the
only what
In this way, we seek to bring the statutory interpretation debate
back to its original focus on statutory meaning, and in doing so, we
introduce a new theory of how judges should interpret statutes.
Specifically, we argue that judges should adopt an intentional stance.
The intentional stance, unlike the search for actual intent, does not
require knowledge of what legislators were actually thinking when
they wrote a statute.28 Rather, it involves the imputation of
intentionality to the legislature in order to figure out what its statutes
25. Holmes, supra note 7, at 417.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 59.
27. Holmes, supra note 7, at 419.
28. See generally MCCUBBINS & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2; Stephen

Breyer, The Usefulness of Legislative History: Examples, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.

845 (1992) (defending courts' careful use of legislative history); Harry
William Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv. 737
(1940) (presenting a critical analysis of the use of extrinsic aids in statutory
construction); McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 20 (proposing a
method for interpreting legislation that is grounded in a positive theory of the

behavior of legislators and the president); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra

note 20 (positing positive political theory as way to ascertain legislative
intent); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1417 (2003) (setting forth a theory
of legislative rhetoric that takes into account the negotiations that go into the
drafting of legislation); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Can
Legislative Records Aid Statutory Interpretation? Inference, Credibility and
Collective Intent in the U.S. Congress (2005) (manuscript on file with authors)
(discussing the branch of non-cooperative game theory that examines legislative decision making).
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mean. As we discuss at length in the next section of this paper, all
humans regularly use the intentional stance as a tool for determining
what something means; thus, it should pose no problems for judges.
Indeed, whether we seek to understand statutes, the actions of our
pets, corporations, or markets, we must first treat the object as if it
had intentions and then ask "what does it mean?"
III. THE INTENTIONAL STANCE
It is well known among both cognitive scientists and
philosophers that humans impute intentions to nearly everything they
encounter.29 Indeed, as humans, we treat others as rational actors
when we make choices in social situations or when we design mouse
traps by reasoning about what mice prefer (i.e., cheese). We even
impute intentions to inanimate objects, such as "the stubborn sticking
car door; the uncooperative computer; the automobile with a
personality; and especially the pet who understands."3
Dennett
refers to this tendency to impute intentions to objects in our
surroundings as the intentional stance-that is, "treating the object
whose behavior you want
to predict as a rational agent with beliefs,"
31
intentions.
desires, and
Lest one think that the intentional stance is little more than a
manner of speaking, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner argue that
imputing intentionality to individuals, collectivities, and objects is a
fundamental characteristic of human cognition.32 These scholars
emphasize that intentionality emerges from the process of conceptual
blending, a process in which humans project their own intentionality
onto otherwise non-intentional objects and events. They suggest that
such blending enables humans to construe virtually any individual,
collectivity, object, or event as intentional.33 Thus, in these scholars'
view, the intentional stance that Dennett describes is a direct result of
29. DENNETr, supra note 1, at 15; GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER,
THE WAY WE THINK: CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN

COMPLEXITIES 100 (2002); Alexandra C. Horowitz & Marc Bekoff,
NaturalizingAnthropomorphism: BehavioralPrompts to Humanizing Animals
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
30. Horowitz & Bekoff, supra note 29, at 6.
31. DENNETr, supra note 1, at 15.
32. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 29, at 349 (noting that
intentionality is part of a "pattern of meaning construction").
33. Id. at 100-01.
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the way that humans think. 34
The intentional stance, however, is far more than simply a
characteristic of human cognition. It is also an essential part of how
humans come to construct meaning, to predict the actions of others,
and to interpret phenomena in the world around them. 35 According
to Fauconnier and Turner, imputing intentions to others serves a
functional purpose because "[w]e interpret each other on the basis of
the view that people's actions and reactions are intentional...
everything6 we do and think and feel is based on the relations it
covers."
To take a concrete example of the functional purpose the
intentional stance serves, consider Dennett's discussion of how every
time we drive on the highway, we stake our lives on our expectations
about other drivers' intentions. 37 For example, in order to drive on
the highway in the first place, we must believe that the other drivers
share our intent to drive safely, to stay within the lanes, and to drive
in the proper direction. 38 If we did not have this belief and, instead,
thought that the other drivers intended to drive recklessly so as to
cause as many accidents as possible, it is unlikely that we would
enter the highway at all.
Taking the highway analogy one step further, consider how
imputing intentions to other drivers helps us to figure out what they
mean when they undertake certain actions. For instance, suppose
that we observe another driver on the highway use his left turn
signal. What does this signal mean? For anyone who has driven in
modem society, the answer is obvious: it means the other driver
intends to turn left. Although this answer seems obvious to the
modem driver, deeper reflection reveals that it is actually anything
but obvious. Indeed, it is possible that the driver using his left turn
signal has accidentally turned it on (and, therefore, does not intend to
turn left). This possibility, however, rarely, if ever, crosses our
minds. Rather, upon observing the other driver use his left turn
signal, we impute intentionality to him and conclude that his use of
34. FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 29, at 349.
35. DENNETr, supra note 1, at 48; FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 29,
at 100.
36. FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 29, at 100.
37. DENNETr, supra note 1, at 48.
38. See id.
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the left turn signal means that he is going to turn left-a prediction
that, more often than not, turns out to be correct. In this way, the
intentional stance enables us to determine the meaning of the other
driver's signal, to understand his actions, and to make accurate
predictions about his behavior. This is no less true of other situations
and other types of signals, for although the use of the intentional
stance is by no means foolproof, "there are large areas in which [the
intentional stance] is extraordinarily reliable in its predictive
39
power."
Note also that in the highway analogy, we are concerned with
metaphorical (not actual) intent. For example, when interpreting
what the other driver's turn signal means, we do not consider his
actual thought processes, nor do we care about his actual intent.
Herein lays the beauty of the intentional stance: our capacity to use it
is "quite unaffected by ignorance about brain processes--or even by
large-scale misinformation about brain processes. '4° Thus, when we
take an intentional stance toward the other driver, we simply treat
him as though he is a rational actor with beliefs, desires, and
intentions. We then interpret his signal in that light.
For our purposes, the most important aspect of the above
discussion is that we also use the intentional stance when interpreting
the actions of collectivities. Consider the following examples:
With benign intent, the United States has behaved, and
until its power is brought into a semblance of balance, will
continue to behave in ways that annoy andfrighten others..
41
Most Americans saw little need to explain our
actions.42
The Santa Clara case held that a corporationwas a person
under the fourteenth amendment, and thus entitled to its
protection. . . .43 Most later progressive legal thinkers,
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Kenneth N. Waltz, America as a Model for the World? A Foreign

Policy Perspective, 24 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 667, 669 (1991) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 668.
43. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 173 (1985-1986) (emphasis added).
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however, followed Ernst Freund's more "realistic" effort,
idea of corporate "personality" as merely a
dismissing 'the
4
"metaphor.
The jury must first decide whether aggravating circumstances exist in the so-called aggravation phase . . .45
[O]ne must assume the jurors followed the court's
instructions during deliberations and their subsequent
recommendation of death reflected a belief in the existence
of at least one aggravating circumstance. 4
[I]t is evident that each departmentshould have a will of its
own; and consequently should be so constituted that the
members of each should have as little agency 47as possible in
the appointment of the members of the others.
The Court's opinion serves to communicate an institutional
to
decision.... In most cases, justices therefore try
48
opinion.
an
join
to
possible
as
persuade as many others
[M]any Asian stock markets have continued to rally this
year. . . . "Such behavior may seem odd.., but it does
appear that markets are behaving entirely rationally. .... ""
[I]nvestors had been buying stocks like Semen Gresik, a
cement maker in Indonesia, helping to push that market
higher. 49
The law provides a basis for bureaucracy's existence,
specifies its powers and jurisdiction, and enables its
44. Id. at221.
45. Marc R. Shapiro, Re-Evaluating the Role of the Jury in Capital Cases
After Ring v. Arizona, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 633, 648 (2004)

(emphasis added).
46. Id. at 653.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
48. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLrITCs, 239-40 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis added).

49. Conrad de Aenlle, Why Stock Markets Stayed Calm in Southern Asia,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 3.9 (quoting Paul Niven, Head of Strategy at a
London fund management company) (emphasis added).
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decisions to be enforced... . Bureaucraciesfrequently are
monopoly providers of services for the public.... 50 Of
course, speaking of "bureaucracy" is to engage in overBureaucratic agencies certainly are not
simplification ....
Notwithstanding these very real methodomonolithic ....
logical and epistemological problems, the actor-oriented,
captures bureaucracy's role
bureaucratic-centered image...
51
process.
governance
in the
The above quotations make four things clear: 1) we take an
intentional stance toward nearly everything we encounter, including
collectivities; 2) our intentional stance involves metaphorical (not
actual) intent; 3) our intentional stance helps us to understand,
predict, and discern meaning from the actions of collectivities; and 4)
our intentional stance, by and large, works for us.
Our third point-namely, that the intentional stance helps us to
understand, predict, and discern meaning from the actions of
collectivities-is perhaps best understood by returning once again to
our highway analogy. Just as we imputed intentionality to the other
driver to understand what his use of the left turn signal meant, so too
do we impute intent to collectivities in order to understand what their
actions mean. As was the case with the other driver, it is not the
actual thought processes of individuals within the collectivity that
interest us; rather, we treat the collectivity as an actor with beliefs,
desires, and intentions in order to figure out what its actions mean.
To illustrate our fourth point (that the intentional stance, by and
52
large, works for us), we return, once again, to Dennett.
Specifically, he states:
Do people actually use this [intentional] strategy? Yes, all
the time. There may someday be other strategies for
attributing belief and desire and for predicting behavior, but
this is the only one we all know now. And when does it
work? It works with people almost all the time .... The
strategy also works on most other mammals most of the
time.... It also works on some artifacts.... The strategy
50. Larry B. Hill, Who Governs the American Administrative State? A

Bureaucratic-CenteredImage of Governance, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &

261, 271 (1991) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 263.

THEORY

52. DENNETr, supra note 1.
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53
even works for plants.

IV. THE INTENTIONAL STANCE
AND STATUTORY MEANING

The preceding discussion of the intentional stance suggests two
important lessons for scholars engaged in debates about legislative
intent and statutory interpretation. First, because the legislature is a
collectivity in the same sense that corporations, courts, markets, and
juries are collectivities, it makes little sense for us to try to discern its
actual intent. Indeed, we do not attempt to discover the actual
thought processes of Supreme Court justices when trying to
understand their latest opinion,5 4 nor do we ask ourselves about the
actual thought processes of individual investors when trying to
understand the market.5 Rather, we take an intentional stance and
impute metaphorical intent to these collectivities in order to figure
out what their actions mean. We should do nothing different when
we seek to understand the legislature and its statutes.
Second, because actual intent (if it exists) is not necessary for
understanding what the actions of individuals and collectivities
mean, we seek to shift the terms of the statutory interpretation debate
away from the search for actual legislative intent and toward the
quest for what statutes mean. While we do not deny that discussions
of actual intent are important parts of metaphysical debates within
philosophy, 56 such discussions are fruitless in normative debates
53. Id. at 21-22.
54. Although there is a large industry in political science that predicts
Supreme Court votes, these studies do not claim to be examining the thought
processes of individual jurists. Rather, they use various measured indicia to
predict voting patterns. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998); DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING

(1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrTuDINAL MODEL (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal

et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
55. Indeed, attempts to model market behavior on the basis of the rational
behavior of individual investors have failed. See Jayendu Patel et al., The
RationalityStruggle: Illustrationsfrom FinancialMarkets, 81 AM. ECON. REV.

232 (1991); Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi
Rationalityin Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071 (1985).
56. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 1; FRED DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND
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about how judges should interpret statutes and in positive debates
about legislative action. Indeed, because Article I of the United
States Constitution 57 grants sole lawmaking authority to the
legislature and because it requires the legislature to pass statutes in
order to change the law, the task of statutory interpretation must
involve a consideration of what statutes mean. Elsewhere, we
provide a more detailed account of how exactly judges ought to go
about discerning statutory meaning, 58 but suffice it to say for now
that understanding what statutes mean begins and ends with the
intentional stance and the imputation of metaphorical (not actual)
intent.
In closing, we wish to draw one final distinction between our
approach and those that others have adopted: namely, our intentional
stance toward acts of Congress does not imply that we believe that
jurists should read into the language of a statute whatever whim suits
them, 59 whether it be the law's integrity, 60 the current view of
political or social opinion, 61 public motives, 62 or a rational, public
purpose. 63 Nor do we believe, as does Stanley Fish,64 that we exist
within an interpretive community and that certain interpretations and
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION (1981); JERRY FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF
MIND (1983); JERRY FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1987); J. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1983).
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1.
58. See generally MCCUBBINS & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2; see also

Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, CanonicalConstruction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669 (2005); McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra
note 20 (proposing a positive theory of behavior of legislators and the
president as a means to interpret legislation); McNollgast, Positive Canons,
supra note 20 (positing positive political theory as a way to ascertain
legislative intent).
59. See Schanck, supra note 22, at 2597 (noting that a postmodern theory,
no matter how general, will never serve in all contexts as the correct method of
interpreting statutes).
60. See Dworkin, supra note 22.
61. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 22; Aleinikoff, supra note 22.
62. See Macey, supra note 11.
63. See HART & SACKS, supra note 24.
64. See Schanck, supra note 22, at 2541-46 (asserting that Fish argues "all
facts, ideas, principles, thoughts, and propositions are socially and culturally
produced, and therefore all purported knowledge consists of interpretations and
beliefs").
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reasoning are impossible to escape. Rather, we emphasize that the
passage of legislation is political and partisan, 65 and so, too, is its
interpretation. Indeed, key aspects of any legislation will be hotly
debated and the partisan battle that gave rise to the legislation will be
repeated at each opportunity to interpret (or re-interpret) the
legislation.
Thus, we believe that, far from being reflections of jurists'
whims, statutes are authoritative policy communications from the
legislature and are, in many ways, analogous to wills. For example,
when interpreting wills, we impute intentions to the testator, just as
we impute intentions to the legislature when interpreting statutes.
Often, the testator establishes a trustee to carry out his or her
instructions and to interpret the meaning of the will under changing
circumstances. This is similar to executive agencies' implementation
of statutes. When interpreting wills, we do not leave it to the reader
to find his or her own interpretation, for if we did, we would soon
find inheritance practices completely changed, with new equilibrium
behaviors arising to replace wills, trusts, and bequests. 66 Rather,
when questions arise as to what a will means, we may need to look at
other indicia of meaning. Is the meaning explained elsewhere, in
some extrinsic aid that allows us to understand a will's meaning?
Similarly, should we look to trustworthy extrinsic aids that help to
define a statute's meaning? 67 This exercise is intentionalism, in the
65. GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA:
RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
17-189 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
66. See Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation,and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J.
630, 649 (1992) ("Limiting attention to the reliably evidenced, authenticated
words of the will... ensures that private decisions expressed in proper and
objective form will be protected against interference by others who may
disapprove of or resent those decisions").
67. Justice Scalia has argued that trustworthy extrinsic aids do not exist.
See ROY M. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, 13 THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE

UNITED

STATES:

HEARINGS

AND

REPORTS

ON

SUCCESSFUL

AND

UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SEN-

ATE JUDICIARY COMMrITEE, 1916-1986, at 65 (1989).
MCCUBBINS & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2. However, we

We disagree.

See

will leave to another

venue discussion of the conditions for trust, see generally ARTHUR LUPIA &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998) (explaining how citizens gather and use
information), that define which statutes and actions within the legislature are
trustworthy and which are not.
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imputed metaphorical sense. It is a commonly used method of
inferring the meaning of actions and an appropriate approach to
statutory interpretation.

